

Message Text

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FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: DABROWA JULY 21 WARSAW PACT PRESS
CONFERENCE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

BEGIN SUMMARY: IN FOLLOW-UP QS AND AS AFTER PRESS STATEMENT
(MBFR VIENNA 0402) WARSAW PACT SPOKESMAN DABROWA (POLISH REP)
HAD TO DEAL WITH TWO MAJOR AREAS: DATA AND THE QUESTION OF WHAT
COMMITMENTS NON-US DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE TO GIVE PRIOR
TO SECOND-STAGE REDUCTIONS IN LINE WITH EASTERN FEBRUARY 19
PROPOSAL. DABROWA TREATED THE DATA ISSUE CAREFULLY, REFUSED
TO BE DRAWN INTO COMPARISONS OF ACTUAL DATA, AND
TOOK THE STAND THAT ALL THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED
INTERNALLY BY THE PARTICIPANTS. ALTHOUGH HE CHARGED THAT
NATO DATA FOR THE ALLIANCE AND FOR THE WARSAW PACT WERE
INCORRECT, THE POLISH SPOKESMAN SAID THAT "IT IS QUITE LOGICAL
THAT FIGURES DEPEND ON THE METHOD OF CALCULATION" WHEN ASKED
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FOR WAYS TO RECONCILE THE EXISTING DIFFERENCES. WHEN THE

QUESTIONERS TRIED TO PIN HIM DOWN ON WHAT THE EAST UNDERSTANDS UNDER GENERAL GUARANTEES CONCERNING REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS EXPECTED FROM THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, DABROWA EXPLAINED: THE EAST WANTS THE WEST TO AGREE THAT THERE WILL BE SECOND-STAGE REDUCTIONS AND THAT THE NON-US DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WILL MAKE THEIR CONTRIBUTION. HE SUPPLEMENTED THAT BY SAYING THAT THESE PARTICIPANTS SHOULD "STATE THE APPROXIMATE DATE AND VOLUME OF THEIR REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND STAGE". IN FOLLOW-UP EFFORTS TO HAVE HIM ADMIT THAT THE EAST WAS ACTUALLY ASKING FOR NATIONAL COMMITMENTS, HE DODGED THE ISSUE BY STATING ON A FEW OCCASIONS THAT GENERAL OBLIGATIONS ENVISAGED BY THE EAST ARE NETIERH "BLOC NOR NATIONAL", BUT THAT THEY ARE RATHER "GENERAL IN CHARACTER". END SUMMARY

BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED TEXT:

1 Q. IS IT POSSIBLE TO GET DETAILS OF THE FIGURES YOU GAVE TO THE WEST OF YOUR FORCES IN ORDER THAT WE AS JOURNALISTS CAN MAKE SOME JUDGMENT ABOUT THE BALANCE THAT YOU SAY EXISTS BETWEEN THOSE FORCES?

A. I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO ENTER INTO DETAILS. I WOULD SAY AGAIN THAT OUR DATA CONCERNS THE OVERALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF WARSAW TREATY FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, AND THAT INCLUDES THE FIGURES FOR THE GROUND FORCES.

2 Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF KEEPING THIS INFORMATION SECRET AT THIS STAGE.

A. THE FIRST POINT IS THAT WE ARE BOUND BY THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF OUR TALKS. WE THE SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS DO NOT CONSIDER USEFUL THE WESTERN LEAKS ABOUT THIS SUBJECT. AND SECOND, THE QUESTION IS YET TO BE DISCUSSED AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE, AND THEREFORE WE CONSIDER IT WOULD BE IMPROPER TO DISCUSS THESE WITH THE PRESS.

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3. Q. MAY I REPHRASE THIS QUESTION: ARE THOSE FIGURES THAT YOU GAVE AT GREAT VARIANCE TO THE FIGURES PUBLISHED FIRST BY NATO SOURCES.

A. WHEN COMPARED, THE FIGURES WE GAVE AND THOSE TABLED BY NATO IN 1973 ARE NOT IDENTICAL. ONE CAN HARDLY ASSUME THAT THESE FIGURES WOULD BE IDENTICAL. THERE ARE MANY REASONS FOR THAT. THIS IS NOT THE PROPER PLACE TO DIS-

CUSS THESE REASONS. PERSONALLY I BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE
WAYS OF EXPLAINING THESE DIFFERENCES.

R. Q. WHEN YOU ASKED THE WEST TO PRODUCE THE RESPECTIVE
UP TO DATE FIGURES, WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY RESPECTIVE.

A. IN MY OPINION, RESPECTIVE IS DATA COMPARABLE TO THE
DATA WE HAVE GIVEN. (SUPPLEMENETARY Q. THEY ARE NOT?)
THEY ARE NOT RESPECTIVE.

5. Q. WHAT DO YOU THINK ARE WAYS TO RECONCILE THIS
DIFFERENCE.

A. I SEE METHODS TO GET AN AGREEMENT ON THE
QUESTION OF DATA IN THE PROCESS OF RUTHER NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS QUITE LOGICAL THAT FIGURES DEPEND
ON THE METHOD OF CALCULATION. SO FAR, THESE
METHODS OF CALCULATION HAVE NOT BEEN DISCUSSED.
THEREFORE I AM NOT GOING TO DISCUSS THIS HERE.

6. Q. IN YOUR STATEMENT YOU QUOTE BREZHNEV AS
SAYING THAT THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES
CONCERNING WARSAW TREATY AND NATO FORCES. NOW THE
1973 NATO ESTIMATES CITED 925,000 FOR THE WARSAW
PACT AND 777,000 FOR THE NATO FORCES. THAT IS A
150,000 DIFFERENCE. IN YOUR VIEW, IS THAT A SIGNIFICANT
DIFFERENCE?

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FROM US REP MBFR

A. IN OUR VIEW, THE NATO FIGURES ARE INCORRECT
BOTH AS FAR AS CONCERNS THE ESTIMATE OF THE SOCIALIST
ARMED FORCES AS WELL AS THE NATO ARMED FORCES.

7.Q. WHAT DOES IT MEAN, "MORE OR LESS EQUAL"? IN REAL
NUMBERS, WHAT DOES THAT MEAN.

A. I THINK YOU SHOULD PUT THIS QUESTION TO SECRETARY-
GENERAL BREZHNEV. IN MY VIEW, EQUALITY MEANS NOT PER-
HAPS IDENTICAL FIGURES, BUT FIGURES WHICH ARE IN THE
SAME RANE OF MAGNITUDE. THAT'S EQUALITY. IN OTHER
WORDS, EQUALITY IS THAT THERE IS NO ACUTE DIFFERENCE
IN THE SIZE OF FORCES.

8.Q. WHERE DOES AN ACUTE DIFFERENCE BEGIN? AT 100,000,
OR 50,00, OR WHAT?

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A. THAT IS THE MILITARY ESTIMATION. I WILL NOT CITE
ANY PARTICULAR FIGURES ON THAT ASPECT. BUT AS I HAVE
ALREADY SAID, WE ARE GOING TO ENTER INTO DICUSSION
ON THIS MATTER WITH OUR WESTERN PARTNERS.

9.Q. HAVE YOU ALREADY REACHED AGREEMENT ON WHAT
GROUND FORCES ARE?

A. THE QUESTION WAS DISCUSSED DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.
THERE ARE SOME SIGNS THAT AN AGREEMENT ON THIS ISSUE
IS FEASIBLE, BUT THE AGREEMENT HAS NOT YET BEEN REACHED.

10. Q. YOU MENTIONED IN YOUR INTRODUCTION THAT THIS ROUND
WILL PROVE IMPORTANT IN THE PROGRESS OF THE TALKS. THIS
IS THE FIRST TIME THAT SUCH AN EVALUATION HAS BEEN
GIVEN BY A SPOKESMAN OF THE WARSAW PACT. DOES THAT
MEAN THAT DESPITE THE LACK OF ANY CONCRETE AGREEMENT
YOU HAVE NOTED AREAS WHERE SOME SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS
CAN BE MADE.

A. I DO NOT SHARE THE OPINION THAT THERE WAS SUBSTAN-

TIVE PROGRESS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF MY TERMINOLOGY SUGGESTED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN GROUNDS ESTABLISHED FOR FURTHER PROGRESS, IT WAS SO BECAUSE IN THE OPINION OF THE SOCIALIST STATES, BOTH IN THE LAST ROUND AS WELL AS IN THE PREVIOUS ROUNDS, THEY ALL TOOK SOME STEPS TOWARDS FUTURE PROGRESS OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. WE CONSIDER THAT THE DISCUSSIONS DURING THE 9TH ROUND HAVE BEEN USEFUL DISCUSSIONS WHICH MADE THE POSITIONS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS CLEAR; EACH NEGOTIATING PARTNER UNDERSTANDS THE POSITION OF THE OTHERS BETTER; WE ARE DISCUSSING VERY CONCRETE PROBLEMS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS; WE HAVE ESTABLISHED PERHAPS A GOOD FRAMEWORK FOR THE DISCUSSIONS; WE HAVE PERHAPS SINGLED OUT SOME NEW PROBLEMS; AND ALL THIS WE CONSIDER AS BEING USEFUL WORK, WHICH WE HOPE WOULD HELP IN THE FUTURE.

11.Q. WHAT IS YOUR PURPOSE FOR ASKING FOR INDIVIDUAL CEILINGS FROM THE SEPARATE STATES, WHEN YOUR AIM SURELY OUGHT TO BE TO GET SOME SORT OF CEILING ON BOTH SIDES. AND DO YOU NOT THINK THAT BY MAINTAINING THIS DEMAND LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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YOU ARE TRYING TO INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL ARRANGEMENTS ON THE NATO SIDE?

A. THE POSITION OF THE SOCIALIST STATES ON THIS IS THE FOLLOWING. WE CONSIDER THAT THESE ARE NEGOTIATIONS OF 19 SOVEREIGN STATES, AND 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THESE ARE NOT BLOC-TO-BLOC NEGOTIATIONS. WE CONSIDER THAT EACH PARTICIPATING STATE SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DETENTE IN THE MILITARY FIELD. WE ARE AGAINST THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE CEILINGS BECAUSE ACCORDING TO THIS CONCEPT, AFTER THE AGREEMENTS ARE SIGNED, SOME STATES WOULD REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES, SOME COULD NOT REDUCE, AND SOME COULD EVEN INCREASE THEIR ARMED FORCES, IN COMPARISON WITH THEIR PRESENT STRENGTH. COLLECTIVE CEILINGS ARE NOT THE KIND OF CONCEPT IN THE REDUCTIONS WE PROPOSE.

12.Q. MAY I FOLLOW UP YOUR STATEMENT: IF YOU SAY THAT THERE WOULD BE THE CHANCE FOR ONE SIDE TO REDUCE, AND IT MAY OR MAY NOT, AND SOME PEOPLE MIGHT INCREASE. NOW THAT WOULD NOT CHANGE THE OVERALL EQUILIBRIUM, WOULD IT?

A. THE ISSUE IS WHETHER INCREASE IN THE INDIVIDUAL ARMED FORCES WOULD LOGICALLY CHANGE THE EQUILIBRIUM OF THE FORCES IN GENERAL. THIS IS A QUESTION THAT SOMETIMES APPEARS IN OUR INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS, BUT I WOULD REFRAIN FROM STATING MY VIEWS ON THAT HERE.

13. Q. YOU SAY THAT YOU PUT FORWARD A FULLY JUSTIFIED REQUIREMENT FOR APPROPRIATE GENERAL GUARANTEES BY THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHAT THESE APPROPRAITE GENERAL GUARANTEES ARE?

A. I CAN GO INTO SOME MORE DETAIL ON THAT: AS YOU KNOW, AT THE BEGINNING THE SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS OF COURSE SAID THAT ALL 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES FROM THE BEGINNING. LATER ON, AND IN PARTICULAR ON FEBRUARY 19, WE HAVE RESPONDED TO THE WESTERN IMPRO- TANT DEMAND, AND WE HAVE GIVEN OUR AGREEMENT TO DI- VIDE THE PROCESS OF REDUCTIONS INTO TWO SEPARATE STAGES. CONSEQUENTLY WE HAVE ACCEPTED THE IDEA OF THE DIFFERENT LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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FROM US REP MBFR

CHARACTER OF THE OBLIGATIONS FOR THE USSR AND THE U.S. IN THE FIRST STAGE, AND FOR THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN A SECOND STAGE. WE HAVE AGREED TO DEVELOP THE IDEA THAT THERE BE CONCRETE OBLIGATIONS IN THE FIRST STAGE FOR THE TWO POWERS, AND GENERAL OBLIGATIONS FOR THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN SECOND-STAGE REDUCTIONS. THE DIFFERENCE IS THE FOLLOWING: WE ARE ASKING THE WESTERN STATES TO GIVE US IN THE FIRST-STAGE AGREEMENT GENERAL GUARANTEES THAT THE SECOND STAGE WOULD TAKE PLACE AND THAT THEY WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THAT SECOND STAGE. WE CONSIDER THE MEANING OF GENERAL GUARANTEES-BY THE NON-U.S. DIRECT PARTICIPANTS - THAT THEY STATE THE APPROXIMATE DATE AND VOLUME OF THEIR REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND STAGE. THOSE WOULD BE GENERAL OBLIGATIONS, GENERAL GUARANTEES FOR THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. ON THE OTHER SIDE, FOR THE U.S. AND THE USSR, THERE WILL BE IN THE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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FIRST STAGE CONCRETE OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING THE EXACT DATES AND THE VOLUME OF THEIR WITHDRAWN FORCES - THE NUMBER OF SOLDIERS, TANKS, AIRCRAFT, MISSILES - WHICH ARE TO BE WITHDRAWN. THESE ARE VERY DETAILED OBLIGATIONS. THERE IS ANOTHER DIFFERENCE: THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION START RIGHT AFTER THE SIGNING OF A FIRST-STAGE AGREEMENT, WHILE THE GENERAL OBLIGATIONS OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE ENTERED ON LATER DURING THE SECOND STAGE.

14.Q. BUT THIS ENVISAGES A COMMITMENT IN THE FIRST STAGE FOR A NATIONAL CEILING FOR THE REMAINING NON-DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

A. I AGREE THAT THE QUESTION OF CEILINGS AND THE CHARACTER OF THE CEILINGS, THE NOTION OF BLOC CEILINGS, INFLUENCES AMONG OTHER THINGS ALSO THE QUESTION OF THE GENERAL OBLIGATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

15. BUT THESE ARE IN EFFECT NOT GENERAL OBLIGATIONS IN A BLOC SENSE, THESE ARE NATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.

A. GENERAL DOES NOT MEAN BLOC OR NATIONAL). GENERAL MEANS GENERAL IN CHARACTER, BUT NOT SO CONCRETE AND NOT SO DETAILED. GENERAL DOES NOT MEAN COMMON; IN THE WESTERN SENSE THIS IMPLIES BLOC CHARACTER. I MEAN GENERAL NOT IN THE SENSE OF BLOC OR NATIONAL

OBLIGATIONS. (Q. IT HAS TO BE EITHER BLOC OR NATIONAL.)
THE QUESTION OF GENERAL IN THE CONCEPT I HAVE JUST
EXPLAINED MEANS GENERAL IN CHARACTER, CONTRARY TO
DETAILED OR SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS.

16. BUT NATO TOLD YOU ALREADY IN THE 5TH ROUND THAT IN
THE CASE OF SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF FIRST-PHASE NEGO-
TIATIONS THE WESTERN SIDE IS READY TO GIVE GUARANTEES
FOR A GENERAL REDUCTION. THAT WAS IN THE 5TH ROUND AL-
READY, AND YOU STILL STICK TO THE FORMULA YOU HAVE AL-
WAYS USED.

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A. OF COURSE, THE NATO POSITION ON THIS MATTER WILL BE
EXPLAINED IN A FEW MINUTES. THE NATO DELEGATIONS CON-
SIARANTEES IS SUFFICIENT.
WE DO NOT OF COURSE CONSIDER THAT THIS IS SATIS-
FACTORY. WE NEED GUARANTEES THAT THE SECOND PHASE WOULD
ACTUALLY TAKE PLACE AND THAT EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT WILL
CONTRIBUTE TO THAT SECOND STAGE.

17.Q. YOU WANT SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS OF EACH DIRECT
PARTICIPANT?

A. IF YOU UNDERSTAND THE WORDS SPECIFIC TO STAND FOR
NATIONAL, THAT IS ALL RIGHT. WE SAY GENERAL OR SPECIFIC NOT
IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL OR COLLECTIVE OBLIGATIONS.

18. Q. YOU TALK ABOUT THE DESIRE TO INCREASE CONFIDENCE.
YOU INSIST THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE NATIONAL, WHEN
EVERY EXPERT KNOWS THT THEY ARE BLOC-TO-BLOC. HOW
DO YOU THINK THAT THIS CAN INCREASE CONFIDENCE BETWEEN
THE TWO SIDES, WHEN YOU STAND ON THIS KIND OF
POSITION?

A. I DON'T KNOW WHY THE BLOC-TO-BLOC APPROACH GIVES
YOU MORE CONFIDENCE THAN THE NATIONAL APPROACH.
I DON'T UNDERSTAND THE QUESTION. (Q. BECAUSE IT
DOES NOT CORRESPOND TO THE REALISTIES.) THAT IS YOUR
OPINION, WHICH THE SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS WOULD NOT
SHARE. END UNCLASSIFIED TEXT. RESOR

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